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IN THE
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
AT iilCHMOND.
Record No. 2351
/
NELSON BUTTERY, Plaintiff in Error,
versus
WILLIAM A. BOBBINS, Defendant in Error.
BRIEF AND PETITION OP PLAINTIFF IN ERROR.
To the Honorable The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia:
Petitioner, Nelson Buttery, respectfully represents that iie
is aggrieved by a final judgment of the Circuit Court of
Madison County, Virginia, entered March 22nd, 1940, in a
certain proceeding by motion for judgment pending in said
Court in which he was defendant and William A. Bobbins was
plaintiff.
A transcript of the record in said proceeding as had in
said Court accompanies this petition.
STATEMENT.
This case is a proceeding by notice of motion by Willitim
A. Bobbins to recover from Nelson Buttery for personal in
jury suffered by the plaintiff. Bobbins, while riding in an au
tomobile driven by defendant. Nelson Buttery, as guest of
defendant.
The accident happened on the Skyline Drive ip the
2^ *Shenandoah National Park.
Defendant then and at the institution of this action
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resided at Stanley in Page County. The notice of motion was
served on him while in the Shenandoah National Park in the
area which had formerly been part of Madison County. The
notice of motion was returnable to Madison County.
At the return day defendant filed a plea in abatement to
the jurisdiction of the Court and moved to dismiss and quash
the return.
The plaintiff moved to strike the plea and resisted the mo
tions. The sheriff was examined and testified that he had
served the notice of motion within the boundaries of the Shen
andoah National Park which he considered still a part of
Madison County.
The Court sustained the motion to strike the plea in abate
ment and overruled the motions to dismiss and quash the
return.
First Assignment of Error.
That the Court sustained the motion to strike the plea in
abatement, and took jurisdiction.
Second Assignment of Error.
That the Court overruled defendant's motions to dismiss
and quash the return.
3* *The rulings on this plea and these motions raised in
different form the questions,
(1) Whether under these facts which were alleged the Cir
cuit Court of Madison County had acquired jurisdiction over
this defendant, and
(2) Whether venue was properly laid in Madison County.
Jurisdiction of Defendant.
The question here presented is not whether a Virginia
Court may take cognizance of a cause of action arising in
the Shenandoah National Park. A cause of action for per
sonal injury is transitory and may be enforced in the juris
diction of any sovereignty which has acquired jurisdiction
of the defendant against whom the claim is asserted.
The question is rather whether the state of Virginia has
acquired jurisdiction of the defendant by service of process
by its officer within the Shenandoah National Park.
One further limitation in the question presented must be
noted before turning to a consideration of the statutes re-
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lating to jurisdiction in the Park. The cause of action arose
in the Park and not in Madison County. This fact has an im
portant bearing upon the authority of officers of the state
within the boundaries of the Park.
4* * Statutes of Cession and Jurisdiction.
Chapter 371, Acts of General Assembly of Virginia, 1928
[Acts 1928, page 983, Michie Code 1936, <^<1585 (52)-(58)], au
thorizes the acquirement of lands for the Shenandoah Na
tional Park, pursuant to an Act of Congress approved May
22, 1926, which is set out at ^ 3 [§585 (54)] of the Act This
Act of the General Assembly at §6 [585 (57)] authorizes the
transfer of these lands to the United States. §7 of this Act
[§585 (58)] cedes jurisdiction to the United States thus,
''Section 7. The United States of America is authorized to
acquire by deed or conveyance pursuant to this act land or
lands within the area specified and described in sections three
(3) and four (4) of this act, and exclusive jurisdiction shall
be and the same is hereby ceded to the United States of
ii^erica over and within all the territory in the State of Vir
ginia which is included within the area described in sections
three (3) and four (4) of this act, and deeded and conveyed
to it, pursuant to the terms and conditions of section six (6)
of this act; saving, however, to the State of Virginia the right
to serve civil or criminal process within the limits of the
land or lands thus deeded or conveyed, in suits or prosecu
tions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations in
curred, or crime committed in said State outside of said land
or lands, and on account of rights acquired, obligations in
curred, or crimes committed, on or within said lands, prior
to the date of the giving or service of notice as hereinafter
provided, of the assumption of police jurisdiction over such
land or lands by the United States; and, saving further, to
the said State, the right to tax sales of gasoline and other
motor vehicle fuels and oil for use in motor vehicles, and to
tax persons and corporations, their franchises and proper
ties, on land or lands deeded or conveyed as aforesaid; and
saving, also, to persons residing in or on any of the land or
lands deeded or conveyed as aforesaid the right to vote at all
elections within the county in which said land or lands
5* are located *upon like terms and conditions and to the
same extent as they would be entitled to vote in such
county had not such lands been deeded or conveyed as afore
said, to the United States of America; provided, nevertheless
that such jurisdiction shall not vest in the United States of
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America unless and until it, throug'h the proper officer or
officers, notifies the governor and through him the State of
Virginia, that the United States of America assumes police
jurisdiction over the land or lands thus deeded and con
veyed."
The Congress accepted jurisdiction thus ceded by an Act
approved August 19, 1937 (50 St. 700), §1 of which provides
(U. S. C. A. Title 16, H03c-1),
"The Secretary of the Interior is hereby directed to give
notice to the State of Virginia through its Governor, as con
templated by the Act of the General Assembly of the State
of Virginia approved March 28, 1928, that the United States
assumes police jurisdiction over lands lying in the State of
Virginia and included within the Shenandoah National Park,
title to and exclusive jurisdiction over said lands having been
conveyed and ceded under and by authority of said Act and
accepted by the Secretary of the Interior, saving, however, to
the State of Virginia the right to serve civil or criminal
process within the limits of the aforesaid park in suits or
prosecutions for or on account of rights acquired, obliga
tions incurred, or crimes committed in said State outside of
said park; and saving further to the said State the right to
tax persons and corporations, their franchises and property
on the lands included in said park; and saving also to the
persons residing in said park now, or hereafter, the right to
vote at all elections held within the county or counties in
which said park is situated; and saving further to the said
State the right to tax sales of gasoline and other motor ve
hicle fuels and oil for use in motor vehicles. The Secretary
is further directed to give like notice as to lands conveyed
after August 19, 1937, to the United States under like au
thority at such time or times as he shall determine to be
6* *consistent with the interests of the United States. All
the laws applicable to places under sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States shall have force and effect
in said park. All fugitives from justice taking refuge
-in said park shall be subject to the same laws as refugees
from justice found in the State of Virginia. (Aug. 19, J.937,
c. 703, §1, 50 Stat. 700.)"
And §2 provides,
"Said Park shall constitute a part of the United States
judicial district for the western district of Virginia, and the
district court of the United States in and for said district
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shall have jurisdiction of all offenses committed within the
boundaries of said park. (Aug. 19, 1937, c. 703, §2, 50 Stat.
701.)"
The allegations in the plea and in the motions that notice
was given are not controverted.
Authority of Virginia Within the Ceded Territory.
It will be observed that these acts authorize not a mere
transfer of title to land so that the United States should be
come a landed proprietor, but a cession of jurisdiction and
sovereignty by one sovereign to another.
If there had been no saving clause Virginia would have no
authority, no jurisdiction within the Park. The Park would
be exactly similar in its relation to Virginia to the District
of Columbia. The Act of the General Assembly authorizes
the United States to acquire land or lands within the area
specified.
" * * * and exclusive jurisdiction shall be and the same
is^ hereby ceded to the United States of America over and
within all territory in the State of Virginia which is included
within the area, &c."
The saving clause with respect to process shows the in-
clusiveness of the "exclusive jurisdiction" ceded. That re
serve right to serve process is limited to.
(( « # civil or criminal process * * * in suits or *prose-.
7* ptions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations
incurred or crime committed in said state outside of said
land or lands" * * *
And the further saving of right to serve process in suits or
prosecutions,
"on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred or
crimes committed on or within said lands prior to the date of
giving or service of notice as hereinafter provided of assump
tion of police jurisdiction over such land or lands bv the
United States."
is a further exclusion of the right to serve process in connec
tion with such rights or obligations acquired or incurred
within the Park after notice of assumption of jurisdiction.
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The Act of Congress of August 19, 1937, is equally em
phatic in its assumption of
"Exclusive jurisdiction over said lands," &c.
with the saving in respect to process only, of
" * * * the right to serve civil or criminal process within
the limits of the aforesaid park in suits or prosecutions for
or on account of rights acquired, obligations incurred or
crimes committed in said state outside of said park."
If a definition of exclusive jurisdiction were needed in
respect to the authority of Virginia to serve process within
the boundaries of the Park, the saving clauses found in these
statutes provide it. The canon of construction, expressio
unms, applies with conclusive effect in interpreting these
statutes. Why save to the state the right to serve process in
connection with matters occurring outside the Park unless
the broad cession includes all process in connection with mat
ters occurring Avithin as well as without the boundaries ? And
as the broad cession includes all process, the saving
8* clause *excepts only that to which it relates, process in
connection Avith matters occuring Avithout. By the same
token, process Avith respect to matters occurring within the
territory are excluded from the authority of Virginia.
Moreover, this limitation on the right to serve process Avas
not inadvertent. Inadvertence may not be assumed in in
terpreting legislation. The express particularity of the cir
cumstances under Avhich process may be served Avithin the
Park negatives any inference of inadvertence.
§17 of the Code of 1919 contains a general reservation of
jurisdiction to serve process. But the matter Avas not left
to this general reservation. A specific and limited reserva
tion Avas embodied in these acts relating to the Shenandoah
National Park.
And further, in other cessions of jurisdiction we find the
reservation of the right to serve process not so limited. Thus
in the Act of the General Assembly of 1869-70, p. 479, which
was subject of interpretation in Foley y. Shriver, 81 Va. 568,
570, the cession of land for a Soldiers' Home was on condi
tion that "the state retains concurrent jurisdiction * so
that the courts, magistrates and officers of this state may
take cognizance, execute such process and discharge such
other legal functions within the same, as may not be incom
patible with the consent hereby given." But in the case
9* *cited, Foley v. Shriver, this broader saving clause Avas
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construed to relate only to process ''with reference to
acts done within the acknowledged territory of the state out
side of the ceded lands". Again the act of cession of juris
diction over the Norfolk Navy Yard passed January 25, 1800,
Acts 1800, p. 246, referred to in Western Union, Sc., Co. v.
Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 277, 53 L. Ed. 994, 997, reserved the
right of officers to execute process generally apparently with
out. limitation. So the act of 1918 (Acts 1918, p. 568) re
ferred to in Belt Line R. R. v. Parker, 152 Va. 484, 491, ced
ing exclusive jurisdiction to the United States of land ac
quired for certain purposes excepted "service upon such sites
of all civil and criminal process of the courts of this state."
There was thus ample precedent for reservation of the right
to serve all process, whether in connection with 9, matter aris
ing outside or inside the ceded territory.
But in these statutes of cession relating to the Shenandoah
National Park the provision with respect to process which is
found in the act of cession of jurisdiction over Fort Leaven-
worth (Kans. Acts 1875, p. 95), referred to in Fort Laven-
worth (Kans. Acts 1875, p. 95), referred to in Fort Leaven-
was adopted. That clause is
" * * * saving however to said state the right to serve civil
or criminal process within said Reservation in suits or prose
cutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations in
curred or crimes committed in said state, but outside of said
cession and Reservation * * * ."
10* *So that there is evidently in these statutes relating
to the Shenandoah National Park a very definite pur
pose to limit the authority of officers of Virginia in serving
process within the ceded territory to process connected with
acts or transactions occurring outside the territory ceded.
Or perhaps we may more properly say, the saving clause as
used in these statutes accurately defines the reserved juris
diction in respect to process.
The insertion by Congress of the provisions relating- to
the jurisdiction of the District Court of the Western Dis
trict of Virginia found in §2 of the Act of Congress of Au
gust 19, 1937, are significant. If the Park remained within
the jurisdiction of Virginia, there was no occasion for a pro
vision constituting the Park
"a part of the United States judicial district for the Western
District of Virginia."
As part of Virginia, the District Court had jurisdiction un-
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der §111 of the Judicial Code (U. S. C. Title 28, §192). The
only reason for this provision must lie in the fact that by ces
sion and assumption the jurisdiction of the Court over this
land as part of Virginia has been extinguished.
It will thus be seen that by the terms of these statutes the
officers of Virginia have no authority to execute process in
a suit on a cause of action not arising outside the Park, that
is, in a suit on a cause of action arising within the Park
11# of Cession on Authority of State Within Ceded
Territory.
As we said at the outset there is no question here of the
right of Virginia Courts to take cognizance of a cause of ac
tion arising within the Park. Undoubtedly they may do that
as they may take cognizance of a cause of action arising in
the District of Columbia or in North Carolina or in England.
Such was the holding in Belt Line R. R. v. Parker, 152 Va.
484.
But to enforce a cause of action it is necessary to acquire
jurisdiction of the defendant in some recognized means, by
service of process or attachment of property. In this case
the Court has by service of its process by its officer within
the Park acquired jurisdiction of the defendant in no respect
more effectively than if its officer had served him with ijrocess
while he was in the District of Columbia or in North Caro-
hna. In respect to process in this case, the cause of action
not having arisen ''outside of said land, or lands", the sheriff
had no authority within the Park. It was void process. The
Court has not by this service acquired jurisdiction of the de
fendant.
In Foley V. Shriver, 81 Va. 568, the question was whether
"The National Home for Disabled Volunteer Soldiers" lo
cated on land in Elizabeth City County, was subject to the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Elizabeth City County,
so that a foreign attachment from that Court could reach
12* a *debt owing by that corporation to the defendant.
The land had been purchased by the Soldiers' Home, a
corporation created by an Act of Congress and jurisdiction
had been ceded to the United States by the General Assem
bly by an Act of 1869-70, which, however, reserved the right
to serve process within the boundary of the lands. After
reviewing the authorities the Court
Held: "From the foregoing cases it is clear that no other
legislative power than that of congress can be exercised over
lands within a State purchased by the United States with the
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eonsent of the State for one of the purposes designated, and
that such consent, under the constitution, operates to exclude
all other legislative authority. If the United States has the
right of exclusive legislation over the ceded lands, they also
have the exclusive jurisdiction. The right of exclusive leg
islation gives exclusiye jurisdiction. United States v. Cor
nell, supra; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns. 225; 16 Opinions
Attorney-General 592. ' In this case, the State legislature hav
ing given the required consent, and the United States hav
ing purchased the land in question, the United States have
acquired, V under the Federal Constitution, exclusive jui'isdic-
tion over the ceded lands, and they are no longer a part of
the State of Virginia and are not subject to the jurisdiction
of the State Courts. Persons residing there are not citizens
of Virginia; the property situated there is not subject to the
control or disposal of any State court, and the circuit court of
Elizabeth City county is without jurisdiction within the said
territory. .The reservation in the act of cession of concur
rent jurisdiction with the United States over the same piece
or parcel of land, so that the courts, magistrates and officers
of the State may take such cognizance, execute such process,
and discharge such other legal functions within the same
as may not be incompatible with the consent hereby given,
is subject to the provisions of the first article and eighth
section of the Federal Constitution—that is, as may not be
incompatible with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States, and which may operate to authorize the service
13* by the officers of *the State of the civil and criminal
process of the State courts, with reference to acts done
within the acknowledged territory of the State outside of the
ceded lands."
Ba/nh of Phoebus v. Byrum, 110 Va. 708, 710, presented the
question of whether one domiciled in North Carolina by resi
dence at Fortress Monroe as an enlisted man acquires a resi
dence in ^ Virginia so as to prevent an attachment issuing
against him as a non-resident. §15a, paragraph (2) of the
Code of 1904 reserving- the right to serve process generally
was adverted to as showing that this territory remained part
of Virginia. But the Court held otherwise, that the juris
diction of the United States was exclusive, defining the juris
diction acquired thus,
"In the case of United States v. Corntt, 2 Mason 60, Mr.
Justice Story said: There is nothing incompatible with the
exclusive sovereignty or jurisdiction of one State that it
should permit another State in such cases to execute its
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process within its limits. And a cession of exclusive juris
diction may well be made with a reservation of a right of
this nature, which then operates only as a condition annexed
to the cession, and as an agreement of the new sovereign to
permit its free exercise as quod hoc, his own process. This
is the light in which clauses of this nature (which are very
frequent in grants made by the States to the United States')
have been received by this court on various occasions, on
which the subject has been heretofore brought before it for
consideration, and it is the same light in which it has also
been received by a very learned State court'—citing Com-
momvealth v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72."
The leading authority on this subject of jurisdiction within
territory acquired by the United States and in which juris
diction has been ceded to the United States, is Fort Leaven-
worth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 29 L. Ed. 204.
14* * There Port Leavenworth Reservation within the State
of Kansas had not been excepted from the territory of
the state when the state had been formed in 1861 though the
United States had continued owner of the land. By an Act
of 1875 (Laws of Kans. 1875, p. 95), ''exclusive jurisdiction"
was ceded to the United States, saving right to serve process
connected with transactions occurring outside the cession, and
the right to tax railroad, bridge and other corporations. The
railroad company contended that this reservation of a right
to tax was void as in conflict with the cession. Thus, was pre
sented the question of the nature of the jurisdiction acquired
by the United States upon a cession of jurisdiction identical
in terms with the cession in the acts relating to Shenandoah
National Park.
Mr. Justice Field mentions the three methods by which
the United States may acquire lands within a state as (1)
purchase with the consent of the state, (2) purchase without
the consent and (3) retention of ownership on formation of
the state. He adverts to the apparent supposition at the time
of the adoption of the Constitution that only the first method
would be employed but he continues,
"Since the adoption of the Constitution this view has not
generally prevailed. Such consent has not always been ob
tained, nor supposed necessary, for the purchase by the Gen
eral Government of lands within the States. If any
15* doubt has ever existed as to its power *thus to acquire
lands within the States, it has not had sufficient strength
to create any etfective dissent from the general opinion. The
consent of the States to the purchase of lands within them
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for the special purposes named is, however, essential, under
the Constitution, to the transfer to the General Government,
with the title, of political jurisdiction and dominion. Where
lands are acquired without such consent, the possession of
the United States, unless political jurisdiction be ceded to
them in some other way, is simply that of an ordinary pro
prietor. The property in that case, unless used as a means
to carry out the purposes of the g'overnment, is subject to
the legislative authority and control of the States equally
mth the property of private individuals.'*
Of the effect of cession of jurisdiction with a condition in
respect to process he says,
''The reservation which has usually accompanied the con
sent of the States that civil and criminal process of the state
courts may be served in the places purchased, is not con
sidered as interfering in any respect with the Supremacy of
the United States over them; but is admitted to prevent them
from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. * * *
Thus, in U. S. v. Cornell, 2 Mass. 60, it was held by Mr. Jus
tice Story, that the purchase of land by the United States
for public purposes, within the limits of a State, did not of
itself oust the jurisdiction or sovereignty of the States over
the lands purchased; but that the purchase must be by con
sent of the Legislature of the State, and then the jurisdiction
of the United States under the Constitution became exclusive.
In that case the defendant was indicted for murder com
mitted in Fort Adams, in Newport Harbor, Rhode Island.
The place had been purchased by the United States with the
consent of the State, to which was added the reservation men
tioned, as to the service of civil and criminal process within
it. The main questions presented for decision were, whether
the sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the place vested in
the United States vdthout a formal Act of cession, and whether
the reservation as to service of process made the jurisdiction
concurrent with that of the State. The first question was
answered, as above, that the purchase by consent gave the
exclusive jurisdiction; and, as to the second question, the
court said: 'In its terms, it certainly does not contain any
reservation of concurrent jurisdiction or legislation. It pro
vides only that civil and criminal process issued under
16* the authority of the State, which *must, of course, be for
acts done within and cognizable by the State, may be
executed within the ceded lands, notwithkanding the cession.
Not a word is said from which we can infer that it was in
tended that the State should have a right to punish for acts
12 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
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done within the ceded lands. The whole apparent object is
answered by considering the clause as meant to prevent these
lands from becoming a sanctuary for fugitive from justice for
acts done within the acknowledged jurisdiction of the State.
Now, there is nothing incompatible with the exclusive sov
ereignty or jurisdiction of one State that it should permit
another State in such cases to execute its process within its
limits. And a cession of exclusive jurisdiction may well he
made with a reservation of a right of this nature, which then
operates only as a condition annexed to the cession, and as an
agreement of the new sovereign to permit its free exercise,
as quoad hoc his own process."
The difference in jurisdiction of the United States over
land which it has acquired by purchase with consent of the
state and over land which it has otherwise acquired in re
spect to which jurisdiction has been ceded lies only in the
validity of the conditions which may attend such jurisdic
tion. In respect to land acquired by purchase with consent
of the state conditions may not be imposed which would in
terfere with jurisdiction of the United States, in respect to
cession of jurisdiction otherwise acquired conditions may he
imposed. Thus, Mr. Justice Van Deventer in Surplus Trading
Co. V. Cooh, 281 U. S. 647, 651, 74 L. Ed. 1091, 1095 says,
''As respects such a military reservation, that is, one which
is neither excepted from the jurisdiction of the state at the
time of her admission nor established upon lands purchased
therefor with the consent of her legislature the state undoubt
edly may cede her jurisdiction to the United States and may
make the cession either absolute or qualified as to her may
appear desirable provided the qualification is consistent with
the purposes for which the reservation is maintained and
17* is accepted by the United States and *where such a ces
sion is made and accepted it will he determinative of the
jurisdiction of both the United States and the state within
the reservation.''
Mr. Justice Brewer, in Benson v. TJ. S., 146 U. S. 325, 36
L. Ed. 991, 994, considering the effect of the Kansas Act of
cession in respect to jurisdiction of the United States to try
the accused for murder committed on land within the reser
vation, says,
"This act was before this court for consideration in two
cases: Fort Leavemvorth R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525
(29:264) : Chicago, R. I. S P. R. Co. v. McGlifm, 114 U. S.
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542 (29:270). It was held in those eases that the act was a
valid cession of the jurisdiction to the general government;
and that, although it did not appear that any application had
been made therefor by the United States, yet, as it conferred
a benefit, acceptance of the cession was to be presumed. It
was conceded that article 1, section 8, of the constitution was
not applicable, as there were not within the terms of that sec
tion a purchase of the tract by the consent of the Legislature
of the State, but it was decided that while a State has no
power to cede away its territory to a foreign country, yet, it
can transfer jurisdiction to the general government. In the
opinion in the first case, on pag-e 541, the court observed:
'In their relation to the general government, the states of
the Union stand in a very different position from that which
they hold to foreign governments. Though the jurisdiction
and authority of the general government are essentially dif
ferent from those of the State, they are not those of a dif
ferent country; and the two, the state and general govern
ment, may deal with each other in any way they may deem
best to carry out the purpose of the Constitution. It is for
the protection and interests of the State, their people and
property, as well as for the protection and interests of the
people generally of the United States, that forts,
arsenals, and other buildings for public uses are con
structed witliin the states. As instrumentalities for the
execution of the powers of the general government, they are,
as already said, exempt from such control of the states as
would defeat or impair their use for those purposes, and if,
to their more etfective use, a cession of legislative *au-
18* thority and political jurisdiction by the State would be
desirable, we do not perceive any objection to its gTant
by the Legislature of the State.' And in the opinion in the
second case, on page 546, the prior decision was interpreted
in these words: 'We also hold that it is competent for the
Legislature of a State to cede exclusive jurisdiction over
places needed by the general government in the execution of
its powers, the use of the places being, in fact, as much for the
people of the State as for the people of the United States gen
erally, and such jurisdiction necessarily ending when the
places cease to be used for those purposes,"
In Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 451, 73 L.
Ed. 447, 450, Mr. Chief Justice Taft thus defined the effect
of cession of jurisdiction by a state in respect to lands ac
quired by the United States, referring to Fort Leavemvorth
R. R. V. Lotve, snpra,
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''In answering this claim, the court pointed out that the
United States, without the consent of a state, might purchase
or condemn for its own use state land for a national purpose,
and that, without any consent or cession by the state, such
jurisdiction would attach as was needed to enable the United
States to use it for the purpose for which it had been pur
chased. The court held that in such a case when the purpose
ceased, the jurisdiction of the federal government ceased.
But the court further held that when a formal cession was
made by the state to the United States, after the original
purchase of the ownership of the land had been made, the
state and the government of the United States could frame
the cession and acceptance of governmental jurisdiction, so
as to divide the jurisdiction between the two as the two par
ties might determine, provided only they saved enough juris
diction for the United States to enable it to carry out the
purpose of acquisition of jurisdiction."
And Mr. Chief Justice Hughes in United States v. Unzeuta^
281 U. S. 138, 142, 74 L. Ed. 761, 733, says on this subject,
19* *"When, in such cases, a state cedes jurisdiction to
the United States, the state may impose conditions
which are not inconsistent with the carrying out of the. pur
pose of the acquisition. Ft. Leavenwortli R. Co. v. Lowe,
supra; Chicago, R. I. S P. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542,
29 L. Ed. 270, 5 Sup. Ct. Rej). 1005; Benson v. United States,
146 U. S. 325, 330, 36 L. Ed. 991, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 60; Palmer
V. Barrett, 162 U. S. 399, 403, 40 L. Ed. 1015,1016, 16 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 837; Arlington Hotel Co. v. Fant, 278 U. S. 439, 451, 73
Tj. Ed. 447, 450, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 227. The terms of the ces
sion, to the extent that they may lawfully be prescribed, de
termine the extent of the Federal jurisdiction."
These authorities clearly establish that the terms of the
cession must govern the authority of the state within the
territory acquired by the United States. There is no con
tinuation of jurisdiction of the state after the cession. The
territory of cession becomes a part of the territory of which
the United States is sovereign as much as the seat of gov
ernment, the District of Columbia; but the state may exer
cise such authority within that territory as may be agreed
upon in the act of cession. The authority of the officers of
Virginia within the Shenandoah National Park in respect to
service of process has been limited to process connected with
acts or transactions "outside said lands". And the service
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of process in this case, relating as it does to acts within the
Park is necessarily yoid.
It is submitted, therefore, the motion to strike the plea in
abatement should have been overruled and the motion to dis
miss and quash the return should have been sustained on the
ground that the defendant has not been served with
20* ^process and the Court has not acquired jurisdiction
over the defendant.
VENUE.
Jurisdiction of the Court.
§6046 provides that,
^ " Any person entitled to maintain an action at law may in
lieu of such action at law proceed by motion before any Court
which would have jurisdiction of such action * * *
Those Courts only where the defendant resides (§6049) or
where the cause of action arose (§6050) haye jurisdiction to
hear and decide this case.
The defendant resides in Page County, not in Madison
County where the action was brought. Obviously the Circuit
Court of Madison County does not have jurisdiction on the
ground that Madison County is the County wherein the de
fendant resides.
The cause of action arose in the Shenandoah National Park.
It remains only to inquire whether the Shenandoah National
Park is within the County of Madison.
But tJie authorities sliow that the Shenandoah National
Park is not within the jurisdiction of the State of Virginia.
It is as separate and distinct from Virginia as is the District
of Columbia. Virginia has retained or saved certain attri
butes of sovereignty within the National Park. But aside from
that limited right the cession is complete. The Park
21* *is in no sense a part of Madison County.
Because this portion of the Park was formerlv geo
graphically a part of Madison County does not continue it
as part of Madison County. It would be a far cry to consider
that this portion continues geographically a part of Madison
County. But, however that may be, the* portion of Madison
County to which the statutes refer are the portions over which
Virginia and Madison County as an administrative agency of
the State have jurisdiction. And certainly these authorities
show that the State has no jurisdiction within the Park ex
cept that expressly saved.
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Therefore it is submitted the only Court in Virginia which
would have jurisdiction to hear and decide this case is the
Circuit Court of Page and it would have jurisdiction only
if it acquired jurisdiction over the defendant by service
of process within the jurisdiction of A^irginia, not in the
Park.
Wherefore plaintiff in error prays that a writ of error
and supersedeas be awarded hiiu, that the judgment of the
Circuit Court of Madison County may be reversed and set
aside, that judgment be entered dismissing the motion for
judgment and quashing the return and that defendant be
dismissed with his costs.
Counsel desire to be heard orally on this petition, if the
Court considers it advisable.
22* *A copy of this petition was delivered to E. V. Wal
ker, Counsel for the plaintiff' on July 20, 1940, at 11:45
A. M.
And petitioner will ever pray, &c.
NELSON BUTTERY,
By Counsel.
DUKE & DUKE,
WALSH & AVADDELL.
We, the undersigned attorneys at law, practicing in the
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia do hereby certify
that in our opinion the judgment referred to in the forego
ing petition should be reviewed by the Supreme Court of
Appeals of Virginia.
AVM. ESKRTDCE DUKE,
H. W. WALSH,
Received July 22, 1940,
M. B. WATTS, Clerk.
AVrit of error granted and supersedeas awarded. Bond
$1,500.00.
GEORGE L. BROWNING.
9-10-40.
Received September 11, 1940.
M. B. W,
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RECORD
EXTRACT OIF RECORD REQUESTED
VIROINIA: i
In the Circuit Court of Madison County.
William A. Bobbins
V.
Nelson H. Buttery
Pleas before the Judge of the Circuit Court of the County
of Madison, at the courthouse thereof, on Monday, Janu
ary 1st, 1940.
Be It Remembered that heretofore, to-wit, in the Clerk's
Office of said court on the 15th of December, 1939, came Wil
liam A. Bobbins and filed his notice of motion against Nel
son H. Buttery, which notice, with the return thereon, is in
these words and figures;
NOTICE OP MOTION.
To Nelson Buttery:
You are hereby notified that on the 1st day of January,
1940, at 10 A. M., or as soon thereafter as it may be heard,
the undersigned will make a motion in the Circuit Court of
Madison County at the Court House in Madison, Virginia,
for a judgment against you for the sum of Five Thousand
Dollars ($5,000.00), which sum is due and owing by you to
the undersigned for the damages, wrongs and injuries here
inafter set forth, to-wit:
That heretofore, to-wit, on the 18th day of June,
page 2 }■ 1939, at about 3 o 'clock A. M. I was riding at your
invitation as your guest in an automobile owned
and operated by you, the same being driven as aforesaid in
a southern direction on the Skyline Drive in Madison County
at a point about 3 miles from C. C. C. Camp No. 2 at Big
Meadows; that said automobile, operated and occupied as
aforesaid was proceeding around a 30% curve and down a
5% grade in a safe and lawful manner and was under your
complete control.
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That thereupon it became and was your duty to continue
to operate said automobile as aforesaid or give me some
warning of your failure to do so and more especially to keep
said automobile under such control as would not unneces
sarily increase the hazards and perils which might have been
ordinarily; expected under the circumstances and conditions
then existing; but that wholly disregarding your duty in this
behalf, you knowingly, recklessly, wantonly and in a grossly
negligent manner, without warning or notice of any kind,
dozed or momentarily fell asleep and lost control of said
automobile, thereby permitting it to proceed without your
control from the west side to the dirt shoulder on the east
side of said road where it struck a large rock and turned
over, by reason of which and as the proximate cause whereof,
I was thrown violently about and in your automobile and
was sorely maimed, bruised, cut and wounded, and my left
shoulder was permanently injured.
And as a result of said injuries, I have been caused to suffer
great physical pain, and will continue to so suf-
page 3 }• fer permanently, and have been and will be obliged
to pay and expend divers sum of money for doc
tors, nurses and hospital bills, aggregating a large sum, to-
wit, $352.00 in and about endeavoring to be relieved and cured
of my injuries and have been forced to lose a great deal of
time, over 100 hours, from my employment, and have suf
fered and will continue to suffer great loss from the perma
nent diminution of my earning capacity by reason of the in
juries aforesaid.
By reason of which and as the proximate result whereof,
I have been damaged to the extent of $5,000.00, wherefor
judgment therefor will be asked at the time and place here-
inabove set out.
Given under mv hand this 8th dav of December, 1930.
•• 7
WILLIAM A. BOBBINS,
By Counsel.
D. L. SMITH and
WALKER AND TAYLOR, p. q.
t  . I
RETURN.
"Executed on the 15 day of Dec. 1939, within the County
of Madison, by delivering a true copy of the within Notice
of Motion, in person to Nelson Butter
T. H. LILLARD,
Sheriff of Madison County, Va."
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page 4 j- And at another day, to-wit, at a Circuit Count
continued and held for said County at the Court
house thereof on Monday, January 1st, 1940, the defendant
filed the following plea in abatement, to-wit:
PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
The said defendant, in his own proper person, comes and
says that this Court ought not to have or take any further
cognizance of the action aforesaid of the said plaintiff, be
cause the said defendant says: that the supposed cause of
action did not, nor did any part thereof, arise in tlie said
County of Madison, Virginia, but that the supposed cause
of the said action and every part thereof, did arise upon the
Shyland liviYe within the Shenandoah National Park, exclu
sive jurisdiction of which said Park is now vested in the
United States of America, was, at the time the supposed
cause of action arose, vested in the United States of America,
and was, at the time of the service of notice of motion in
this cause, vested in the United States of America, and that
at the time of the serving of the notice of motion in this
cause, the said defendant did not reside in the said County
of Madison, Virginia, but that he did then reside, has ever
since resided, and is now residing in the town of Stanley,
County of Page, in the State of Virginia, and this the de
fendant is ready to verify,
page 5 [■ ^ Defendant avers that the action herein is an ac
tion for personal injuries; that he is the sole de
fendant herein; that he is an individual citizen of Virginia
and not a corporation; that the notice of motion herein was
served upon him within the Shenandoah National Park,
which is not in the County of Madison, by the Sheriff of
Madison County. Wherefore, he prays judgment whether
this Court can or will take any further cognizance of the
action aforesaid.
NELSON BUTTERY
By (.sgd) W. E. DUKE, Agent.
State of Virginia
County of Madison, to-wit:
This day, W. E. Duke, Agent for Nelson Buttery, personally
appeared before me. Royce Payne, a Notary Public in and
for the County and State aforesaid, in my County aforesaid,
and made oath that the matters and things stated in the
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foregoing plea are true to the best of his knowledge and be
lief and that he makes this affidavit, as a duly authorized
agent of Nelson Buttery because, on accomit of inclement
weather, said Nelson Buttery was unable to come to Char-
lottesville for the purpose of making this affidavit.
Given under my hand this first day of January, 1"940.
My .commission expires on the 25th day of March, 1941.
(sgd) ROYOE PAYNE, N. P."
page 6 j- And at another day, to-wit, at a Circuit Court
Continued and held for said County at the Court
house thereof on Monday Jan. 22, 1940, the following order
was entered and filed:
On the 1st day of January, 1940, the plaintiff, by counsel,
appeared and moved the Court to set this case for trial and
likewise came the defendant, by counsel, appearing specially,
and moved the Court to permit the Sheriff to amend the re
turn of process on the defendant so as to show the same was
seiwed in the Shenandoah National Park and upon objection
by counsel for the plaintiff and argiiment by counsel, said
motion was overruled and denied.
And thereupon, counsel for the defendant moved the Court
to quash said process and notice of motion because said pro
cess failed to show that the same was served within the
said Park, and upon objection by counsel for the plaintiff
and argument of counsel, said motion to quash was over
ruled and denied.
And thereupon, defendant's plea in abatement was filed
and counsel for the plaintiff moved to dismiss the same, to
which counsel for the defendant objected and was argued by
counsel.
And it appearing to the Court that the defendant's plea
is not well taken and that the plaintiff's motion to dismiss
said plea should bo sustained, it is ORDEREI) that the
defendant's plea in abatement be overruled and dismissed and
that the case be set for trial on its merits on January 22nd,
1940, to all of which action of the Court as aforesaid, counsel
for the defendant excepted and assigned the rea-
page 7 [ sons initialled ''L. F. S." and filed with the pa
pers.
And at another day, to-wit, on the 22nd day of March, 1940,
the following order was entered:
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ORDER.
^ On this, the 22nd day of March, 1940, came again the plain
tiff, William A. Rohbins, in person and by counsel, and like
wise came again the defendant. Nelson H. Buttery, iu person
and by counsel.
And thereupon, came the following jury of seven, the same
being a portion of the venire summoned for the civil as well
as the criminal cases during the term of this Court, and
who, upon examination, being found duly qualified, were
selected, tried, and sworn, according to law, namely; Elmer
T. Lohr, J. E. Gibson, G. .0. Gibson, Marvin Jenkins, 0. J.
Weaver, C. T. Berry, Jesse T. Utz.
Thereupon, after the evidence for the plaintiff
page 8 }• had been introduced, the defendant, by counsel,
moved the Court to strike the evidence so intro
duced and to exclude the same from the consideration by the
jury and assigned grounds therefor:
But the Court overruled said motion and declined to strike
the evidence of said plaintiff ; to which action, and ruling of
the Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted on the grounds
specified in said motion.
And thereupon the evidence for the defendant having been
introduced and the evidence in this case having been,fi3ly in
troduced, the defendant, by counsel, again moved the Court
to strike such evidence and to exclude the same from con
sideration by the jury, upon the grounds specified in his previ
ous motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence.
But the Court overruled the same and declined to strike
the evidence in this case, to which action and overruling of
the Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted on the grounds
assigned in said motion.
Whereupon the Jurors aforesaid, having retired to their
room to consider of their verdict later returned into Court
with the following verdict, to-wit:
"We the jury find ^for the plaintiff and fix his damages
at $1,000.00.
fsgd) ELMER T. LOHR, Foreman."
and the jury was discharged.
page 9 j- Thereupon the said defendant, by counsel, moved
the Court to set aside the said verdict of the jury
22 Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
and to enter up judgment for the defendant upon the follow
ing grounds.:
(1) That the evidence fails to show gross negligence on
the part of the defendant; and
(2) That the conduct of the plaintiff, as shown hy the evi
dence, was itself negligence, and contributed to the injuries
be has complained of; and
(3) That the plaintiff has acquiesced in and assumed what
ever risks were incurred which may have caused the acci
dent; and
(4) That the evidence shows the happening complained of
was a mere accident ;
(5) Giving of instructions for the plaintiff and refusal
of instructions for the defendant.
(6) Admission of e^ddenee on behalf of the plaintiff and
the exclusion of evidence on behalf of defendant.
But the Court likewise overruled this motion and declined
to set aside the verdict aforesaid; to which action and ruling
of the Court the defendant, by counsel, excepted for the rea
sons specified in said motion.
It is therefore adjudged, and ordered that the plaintiff,
William A. Bobbins, recover for and have judg-
page 10 \ ment against the said Nelson H. Buttery for the
sum of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars, the
amount of the award of damages by the jury in its verdict
ascertained, with interest thereon at the rate of six per cent
per annum from the 22nd day of March, 1940, until paid,
together with his costs about his action expended.
And the said defendant having indicated his intention of
applying to the Supreme Court of Appeals for a writ of
error and sKpersedeas to the judgment herein pronounced,
upon his motion it is ordered that execution upon said judg
ment be suspended for a period of sixtv days from" this date,
such suspension, however, shall become operative only upon
the execution by said defendant, or someone for him, with
security satisfactory to the Clerk of this Court, within ten
days from the date of entry of this order, of a suspending
bond in the penal sum of Five^ Hundred ($500.00) Dollars
conditioned and payable according to law.
page 11 i- BILL OF EXCEPTION #1.
''Be it remembered that at the calling of the docket of
this Court at its January term, to-wit, on the first day of
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January, 1940, the defendant. Nelson H. Buttery, appeared
specially by counsel to question the jurisdiction of the Court
and asked the Court of its own motion to dismiss this action
on the ground that the Court has no jurisdiction herein for
the following reasons:
(1) That the accident complained of is stated in the mo
tion herein to have occurred on the Shylcmd Drive in Madison
County;
(2) That at the time the supposed cause of action arose,
at the time of the service of the notice of motion herein, and
at the present time, no part of the Skyline Drive is in Madi
son County, Virginia, that every part thereof and particu
larly the locus of said accident mentioned in the notice of
rnotion is in the Shenandoah National Park, exclusive juris
diction of which had been theretofore conveyed by the State
of Virginia to the United States of America by deeds ten
dered by the State of Virginia conveying to the United States
of America certain lands for the Shenandoah National Park,
which said Park was established on December 26th, 1935,
which said deeds were accepted on December 26th, 1935, Jan
uary 12th, 1937, Jan. 13, 1937 and January 27th,
page 12 1937, by the United 'States of America; that said
deeds were executed in the name of the State of
Virginia and of the State Commission on Conservation and
Development by the Governor of Virginia and the Chairman
of said Commission under and pursuant to the authority of
the Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia approved
March 22nd, 1928 (Acts of 1928, page 988), section 585 (58)
V. C., and recorded in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Courts
of every County, a part of whose former territory had been
conveyed by deed or deeds from said State to said United
States of America, including the Clerk's Office of the Circuit
Court of the County of Madison:
(3) That by the Act authorizing said conveyance of exclu
sive jurisdiction to the United States of America, the State
of Virginia saved to herself:
(a) "The right to serve ci\il or criminal process within
the limits of the Shenandoah National Park in suits or prose
cutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations
incurred, * * in said State, outside of said land or lands,
and
(b) the right to serve civil process on account of rights
acquired, obhgations incurred, * * * on or within said lands
prior to the date of the giving or service of notice of the
assumption of polic?/ jurisdiction" over the lands within the
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SHenandoali National Park by the United States of America
as therein provided,
that the United States of America has assumed said police
jurisdiction^hnd said notice was given as in said section pro
vided, aftep the United States of America had assumed said
police jurisdiction, by Charles West, Acting Secretary of the
Interior, to the Governor of Virginia, and through
page 13 }■ him the State of Virginia, he, the said Acting Sec
retary, having been directed to do so by the Act of
Congress approved August 19th, 1937 (public number 322—
75th Congress) and that the Governor of Virginia having
acknowledged receipt of said notice on December 3rd, 1937,
as appears in the Federal Eegister, volume 2, number 244,
dated December 17th, 1937, page 3295; there is now no right
on the part of any officers of any Court in Virginia to serve
civil process in said Park, where said accident occurred, for
actions on account of rights acquired or obligations incurred
on or within said lands subsequent to the giving of tlie said
notice, that any rights acquired by the plaintiff, if any, and
any obligations incurred by the defendant, if any, herein are
subsequent tliereto, and there was no such right at the time
of the service of the notice of motion herein; and that there
was no such right at the time the accident arose complained
of therein, said accident having occurred on the 18th day of
June, 1939.
(4) That defendant is a resident of the State of Virginia,
residing in the tow of Stanley, in the County of Page, in the
State of Virginia, and that at the time the supposed cause
of action arose, at the time of the service of said notice of
motion in this cause, and' at the present time, defendant re
sides in Page County, Virginia, and this he has verified by
his plea in abatement filed herein;
(5) That the above action was instituted in the Circuit
Court of Madison County, Virginia, the notice of motion in
said cause having been delivered to the Sheriff of
page 14 Madison County, Virginia, who served the same
upon the defendant in Shenandoah National Park,
and thereafter said Sherifi' of Madison County did make the
following return:
"Executed on the 15 day of December, 1939, within the
County of Madison, by delivering a true copy of the within
Notice of Motion, in person to Nelson Butter.
T. H. LILLARD
Sheriff of Madison County* Va."
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(6) That the action herein is a tort action and the only
proper venue is the place where the action arose
page 15 }• or the place the defendant resides, but that said
supposed cause of action and every part thereof
did not arise in Madison County, Virginia, but did arise with
in the Shenandoah National Park, exclusive jurisdiction of
which said Park is now vested in the United States of America,
was, at the time the supposed cause of action arose, vested
in the United States of America and was, at the time of the
service of notice of motion in this cause, vested in the United
States of America, and that said Park is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States of America, the State of
Virginia now having for the reasons above mentioned only
the right to serve process therein for actions arising outside
of said Park so that the only proper venue for any court
within this State is in Page County, Virginia.
Thereupon plaintiff, by counsel, insisted said point was
not well taken and said action should not be dismissed ex
officio as the locus of the accident while within the Shenan
doah National Park, and the place of serving the notice of
motion was within said !^ark was for jurisdictional purposes
still within t^e County of Madison, since it was within the
original territory of said County;
And the defendant offered to prove the facts alleged in
said motion which the Court declined to hear upon the ground
that the Court would take judicial notice of said facts;
The Court being of opinion that, assuming the facts in said
motion set out were true, the motion was not well
page 16 \ taken as the locus of the accident in the Shenan
doah National Park was for jurisdictional pur
poses "within the County of Madison and that said motion
should not be sustained did decline to act"
To which action of the Court in declining to hear evidence
of the facts set out in said motion, and in declining to dis
miss said action ex officio, the defendant by counsel still ap
pearing specially excepted on the ground that the Court has
no jurisdiction to hear and determine this cause on account
of facts stated and the Court ex officio should have dismissed
said action and said evidence should have been hoard and
tenders this, his Bill of Exception which he prays may
be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record which is
accordingly done this 28th day of May, 1940.
(sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH (Seal) "
Judge"
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BILI. OF EXCEPTION #2.
"Be it remembered, that at the calling of the docket of this
Court at its January term, to-wit: on the first day of Janu
ary, 1940, the defendant. Nelson H. Buttery, appeared spe
cially and filed his plea in abatement in the following words,
to-wit:
'Virginia:
In the Circuit Court of Madison County.
William A. Bobbins, Plaintiff
Nelson H. Buttery, Defendant
PLEA IN ABATEMENT.
page 171 The said defendant, in his own proper person,
comes and says that this Court ought not to have
or take any further cognizance of the action aforesaid of
the said plaintiff, because the said defendant says: that the
supposed cause of action did not, nor did any part thereof,
arise in the said County of Madison, Virginia, but that the
supposed cause of the said action and every part thereof,
did arise within the Shenandoah National Park, exclusive
jurisdiction of which said Park is now vested in the United
States of America, w^as, at the time the supposed cause of
action arose, vested in the United States of America, and
was, at the time of the service of notice of motion in this
cause, vested in the United States of America, and that at the
time of the serving of the notice of motion in this cause, the
said defendant did not reside in the said County of Madison,
Virginia, but that he did then reside, has ever since resided,
and is now residing in the toAvn of Stanley, County of Page,
in the State of Virginia, and this the defendant is ready to
verify.
Defendant, avers that the action herein is an action for
personal injuries; that he is the sole defendant herein: that
he is an individual citizen of Virginia and not a corporation;
that the notice of motion herein was served upon him within
the Shenandoah National Park, which is not in the County
of Madison, by the Sheriff of Madison County. Wherefore,
he prays judgfnent whether this Court can or will take any
further cognizance of the action aforesaid.
NELSON H. BUTTERY
By (sgd) W. E. DUKE, Agent
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page 18 [• State of Virginia
County of Madison, to-wit:
This day, W. E. Duke, agent for Nelson H. Buttery, per
sonally appeared before rae, Royee Payne, a Notaiy Public in
and for the County and State aforesaid, in my County afore
said, and made oath that the matters and things stated in
the foregoing plea are true to the best of his knowledge and
belief and that he makes this affidavit,' as a duly authorized
agent of Nelson H. Battery because, on account on inclement
weather, said Nelson H. Buttery was unable to come to Cliar-
lottesville for the purpose of making this affidavit.
Griven under my hand this first day of January, 1940.
My commission expires on the 25th day of March, 1941.
(SGD) ROYCE PAYNE, N. P."
The plaintiff, William A. Robbins, by counsel, moved to
dismiss said plea in abatement on the gTound that it was
well settled that the locus of the accident, to-wit, that por
tion of the Skyline Drive, within which the accident occurred,
while within the territory of of the Shenandoah National
Park, heretofore conveyed by the State of Virginia to the
Dnited States of America, was, for jurisdictional purposes,
still within the County of Madison, since it was within the
original territory of said County.
And the defendant by connsei appearing specially offered
to prove the facts set out in said plea in abatement which
proof the Court declined to hear upon the ground that the
Court would take judicial^ notice of said facts, but that the
locus of the accident, while within the Shenandoah
page 19 j- National Park was, for jurisdictional purposes,
within the County of Madison.
Thereupon the Court sustained the said motion to dismiss
said plea in abatement upon said grounds, overruled and
dismissed the same and set the case for trial. To which action
of the Court in overruling and dismissing said plea and in
refusing to hear proof of the facts set out therein the de
fendant. by counsel, excepted on the ground that the facts
alleged in said plea show that this Court is without jurisdic
tion of the case and that the plea should have been sustained
and tenders this, his Bill of Exception #2, which he prays
may be signed, sealed, and made a part of the record, which
is accordingly done this 28th day of May, 1940.
(sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH (Seal)
Judge*'
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BILL OF EXCEPTION #3.
Be it remembered that at the calling of the docket of this
Court at its January term, to-wit; on the first day of January,
1940, the defendant, Nelson H. Buttery, appeared specially
by counsel to question the jurisdiction of the Court and moved
the Court to dismiss this action on the ground that the Court
has no jurisdiction herein as follows:
page-20 j- (1) That the accident complained of is stated
in the notice of motion herein to have occurred on
the Shylmd Drive in Madison County;
(2) That at the time the supposed cause of action arose,
at the time of the service of the notice of motion herein, and.
at the present time, no part of the Sl^dine Drive is in Madi
son County, Virginia, that every part thereof and particu
larly the locus of said accident mentioned in the notice of
motion is in the Shenandoah National Park, exclusive juris
diction of wliich had been theretofore conveyed by the State
of Virginia to the United States of America by deeds ten
dered by the State of Virginia conveying to the United States
of America certain lands for the Shenandoah National Park,
which said Park was established on December 26th, 1935,
which said deeds were accepted on December 26th, 1935,
January 12th, 1937, January 13th, 1937, and January 27th,
1937, by the United States of America; that said deeds were
executed in the name of the State of Virginia and of the State
Commission on Conservation and Development by the Gov
ernor of Virginia and the Chairman of said Commission
under and pursuant to the authority of the Acts of the Gen
eral Assembly of Virginia approved March 22nd, 1928
(Acts of 1928, page 988), section 585 (58) V. C., and recorded I
in the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Courts of every County,
a part of whose former territory had been conveyed by deed |
or deeds from said State to said United States of America,
including the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County
of Madison;
page 21 \ (3) That by the Act authorizing said convey
ance of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States
of America, the State of Virginia saved to herself:
(a) "The riffbt to serve civil or criminal process within
the limits of the Shenandoah National Park in suits or prose-
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eutions for or on account of rights acquired, obligations in
curred, * in send State, outside of said land or lands, md
(b) the right to serve civil process on account of rights
acquired, obligations incurred, ^  ^ on or within said lands
prior to the date of the giving or service of notice of the
assumption of police jurisdiction'* over the lands within the
Shenandoah National Park by the United States of America
as therein provided,
^at the United States of America has assumed said pohcejurisdiction, and said notice was given as in said section pro
vided, after the United States of America had assumed said
police jurisdiction, by Charles West, Acting Secretary of the
Interior, to the Governor of Virginia, and through him the
State of Virginia, he, the said Acting Secretary, having been
directed to do so by the Act of Congress approved August
l^th, 1937 (public number 322—75th Congress) and that the
Governor of Virginia having acknowledged receipt of said
notice on December 3rd, 1937, as appears in the Federal
Register, volume 2, number 244, dated December 17th, 1937,
page 3295; there is now no right on the part of any officers
of any Court in Virginia to serve civil process in said Park,
where said accident occurred, for actions on account of rights
acquired or obligations incurred on or within said lands sub
sequent to the giving of the said notice, that any rights ac- •
quired by the plaintiff, if any, and any obligations incurred
by the defendant, if any, herein are subsequent
page 22 }■ thereto, and there was no such right at the time of
the service of the notice of motion herein; and
that there was no such right at the time the accident arose
complained of therein, said accident having occurred on the
18th day of June, 1939.
(4) That defendant is a resident of the State of Virginia,
residing in the town of Stanley, in the County of Page, in the
State of Virginia, and that at the time the supposed cause
of action arose, at the time of the service of said notice of
motion in this cause, and at the present time, defendant re
sides in Page County, Virginia, and this he has verified by
his plea, in abatement, filed herein:
(5) That the above action was instituted in the Circuit
Court of Madison County, Virginia, the notice of motion in
said cause haying been delivered to the Sheriff of Madison
County, Virginia, who served the same upon the defendant
in Shenandoah National Park, and thereafter said Sheriff of
Madison County did make the following return:
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"Executed on the 15 day of December, 1939, within the
County of Madison, by delivering a true copy of the within
Notice of Motion, in person to Nelson Butter,
r. H. LILLARD
Sheriff of Madison-Comity, Va/'
page 23 [■ (6) That the action herein is a tort action and
the only proper venue is the place where the action
arose or the place the defendant resides, but that said sup
posed cause of action and every part thereof did not arise
in Madison County, Virginia, but did arise within the Shen-
andoah National Park, exclusive jurisdiction of which said
Park is now vested in, the United States of America, was, at.
the time the supposed cause of action arose, vested in the
United States of America and was, at the time of the serv
ice of notice of motion in this cause, vested in the United
States of Amertca, and that said Park is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States of America, the State of
Virginia now having for the reasons above mentioned only
tlie right to serve process therein for action arising outside
of said Park so that the only proper venue for any court
within this State is in Page County, Virginia.
Thereupon plaintiff, by counsel, insisted said motion was
not well taken and should not be sustained as the
page 24 \ locus of the accident while ivithin the Shenandoah
National Park, and the place of serving the notice
of motion was within said Park was for jurisdictional pur
poses still within the County of Madison, since it was within
the original territory of said County;
.And the defendant offered to prove the facts alleged in
said motion which the Court declined to hear upon the ground
that the Court would take judicial notice of said facts:
The Court being of opinion that, assuming the facts in
said motion set out were true, the motion was not well taken
as the locus of the accident in the Shenandoah National Park
was for jurisdictional purposes within the County of Madi
son and that said motion should not be sustained did overrule
said motion;
To which action of the Court in declining to hear evidence
of the facts set out in said motion, and in overruling said
motion, the defendant by counsel excepted on the ground that
the Court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine this cause
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on account of facts alleged in said motion, and that said
motion should have been sustained and said evidence have
been heard and tenders this, his Bill of Exception #3, which
he prays may be signed, sealed, and made a part of the rec
ord which is accordingly done this 28th day of May, 1940.
(sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH (Seal)
Judge"
page 25 } COURT'S CERTIFICATE.
The undersigned. Judge of the Circuit Court of Madison
County, hereby certifies that the foregoing stenogTaphic re
port and transcript of testimony, and other incidents of the
trial of the case of William A. Robbins v. Nelson H. Buttery,
embracing as it does all the testimony adduced at the trial,
objections to testimony, exceptions to testimony, exceptions
to rulings thereon; also embracing and setting out the motion
to strike the plaintiff's evidence, and exception of the defend
ant to) the action of the Court in overruling said motion; also
embracing and setting out the instructions that were offered
and given in the case, the objections of counsel to the instruc
tions, and exceptions to rulings thereon, was presented to the
Judge of this Court on May 21st, 1940 at 5:30 P. M., for au
thentication. This Court cannot certify that the counsel for
plaintiff has had due and timely notice of this application.
The matters herein contained are true and accurate, full and
complete; in all respects and are certified as a true transcript
of all of the proceedings had at the trial of said case, and the
same is transmitted to the Clerk of this Court to be filed with
and made a part of the record in this case.
The Court certifies in regard to the notice of the opposite
party that the counsel for defendant notified the attorneys
for the defendant by letter of May 8th, a copy of which was
delivered to the Judge of this Court, setting May
page 26 \ 18th as the time for presenting bills of exception
in this case. The Judge of this Court notwith
standing the fact that at the time he. was engaged in the trial
of cases off of his home Circuit, returned for the purpose of
receiving the bills of exception on May 18th, however, none
were presented and nothing was done towards the comple
tion of the record on that day; that on May 20th, the open
ing dav of the Greene County Court, counsel for defendant
presented to the Court skeleton bills of exceptions which
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were wholly and totally incomplete and counsel for defend
ant so admitted; that on May 21st, after having been out of
the County the forenoon of the day, the Judge was approached
by the attorney for the defendant with the bills of exception
which are Herewith certified. Counsel for plaintiff was not
present and At 6 o'clock, the notice which is herewith attached,
was delivered to the Judge.
It is apparent that the bills of exception in this case were
presented without notice to the opposing^ party and as a mat
ter of fact before the notice had been served on the defend
ant attorney. These matters are certified because notwith
standing the fact that the Judge certifies this record as be
ing true and accurate in every respect, he is of the opinion
that proper notice as prescribed by law has not been given
to the opposing party. He therefore certifies the record as
complete and submits the matters of notice to the Supreme
Court of ApiDcals of Virginia for its determination.
This record was presented to me within the
page 27 }■ sixty days and signed by me within the time pre
scribed by law.
Given under my hand this 28th day of May, 1940.
(sgd) LEMUEL) F. SMITH, Judge."
page 28 ]■ ADDITIONAL CERTIFICATES OF JUDGE
WITH RESPECT TO THE BILLS OF
EXCEPTION.
It being suggested to the undersigned, Judge of the Cir
cuit Court of Madison County, Virginia, that the defendant
in the above entitled case desires to apply for a writ of error
and that the certificate heretofore signed with respect to
the facts surrounding the Bills of Exceptions does not fully
set forth the facts with respect to Bills of Exception Num
bers 1, 2 and 3, the following additional facts are hereby
certified:
On May 18, 1940, no Bills of Exception were presented in
accordance with the notice theretofore given. On May 17,
1940, there was served on Counsel for the plaintiff a notice
in writing that Bills of Exception would be presented at the
Court House in Standardsville in Greene County on May
20th, 1940. On that day, May 20th, 1940, Counsel for the de
fendant and Counsel for the plaintiff appeared before the
undersigned and Counsel for the plaintiff objected that the
notice was not sufficient. At that time Counsel for the de-
Nelson Buttery v. William A. Robbins. 33
fendant stated that he was not ready to j)resent all of Ms
Bills of Exception as they had not been completely prepared
and requested that the hearing thereon be continued, to which
Counsel for the plaintiff objected, and the Court having in
dicated that it could not continue such hearing,
page 29 [ counsel for the defendant presented among other
things Bills of Exception numbers 1, 2 and 3 and
requested that they be marked as having been presented.
This was accordingly done and with some modification the
Bills of Exception numbers 1, 2 and 3 so presented were
signed by the undersigned on May 28, 1940.
Given under my hand this 15th day of July, 1940.
(sgd) LEMUEL F. SMITH, Judge.
page 30 J- Virginia;
In the Clerk's Office of the Circuit Court of the County of
Madison, July 20, 1940.
I, Charles J. Ross, Clerk of the Circuit Court of the County
of Madison, Virginia, do hereby certify that the foregoing
is a true, accurate, and complete transcript of the following-
extracts of the record in the action at law therein pending
under the style of William A. Bobbins versus Nelson H. Buf-
tery as appears of record and on file in my office, namely:
The Notice of motion.
The return of service of notice of motion.
The defendant's plea in abatement.
The order entered January 22, 1940,
The final order in said cause entered March .22, 1940,
Defendant's Bills of Exception numbers 1, 2 and 3,
The certificates of the Judge with respect to the notice of
presentation of Bills of Exception dated Mav 28, 1940 and
July 15, 1940,
and which I, as Clerk of said Court, have been
requested in writing to copy on behalf of said defendant for
the purpose of its presentation, along with a petition for a
writ of error and supersedeas to the judgment therein pro
nounced to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.
And T further certifv that it affirmativelv appears from
the papers filed in said action that counsel of record for
said plaintiff had due and written notice of the intention
of said defendant to apply for the foregoing transcript and,
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further, that such counsel likewise had written notice of the
time and place, when and at which the foregoing
iDage 31 J- bills of exception numbers 1, 2 and 3 were pre
sented to the Judge of said Court for verification
and authentication.
Given rinder my hand this 20 day of July, 1940.
CHARLES J. ROSS,
Clerk.
A Copy—Teste:
M. B. WATTS, C. C.
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